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Abstract 
The paper reviews literature on securitization process in real estate markets and an analysis of the subprime 
mortgage market crisis of 2007-2008. In particular, it presents a highlight of the various market participants in 
the securitization process and an overview of securitized transactions in the US secondary mortgage market. The 
paper further presents a highlight of financial malpractices precipitating the subprime mortgage crisis and the 
associated financial implications of the same. In addition, the paper identifies the institutions and participants in 
the subprime mortgage crisis securitized transactions leading to the housing market debacle. The paper further 
explores the creation of ABS and CDOs as an outcome of securitization and a review of empirical literature on 
financial implications associated with the abuse of securitized transactions in the US mortgage market. 
Key Words: Securitization, Asset-Backed Securities, Special-Purpose Vehicles/Entities, Credit enhancement 
and Conduit Lending. 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
ABS                  - Asset-backed Securities  
CDOs                - Collateralized Debt Obligations 
SPV/E               - Special-Purpose Vehicle/Entity 
Fannie Mae       - Federal National Mortgage Association 
Freddie Mac     - Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
 
1. Introduction 
The paper presents a review of general, theoretical and empirical literature on the securitization process in the 
real estate market, a financial analysis of securitization process and an overview of the institutions that 
participate in the process. In particular, the paper reviews both general and empirical literature on securitized 
transactions in the events leading to the subprime mortgage market crisis of 2007-2008. First, the paper 
documents the securitization process in terms of the key participants/institutions involved in the process and their 
role. In addition, it reviews literature on ABS and CDOs as the main forms of securitization in real estate 
markets.  
 
2. Operational definition of terms 
*Securitization- this is a process (in structured finance) that creates complex debt instruments by pooling assets 
(especially receivables) into low risk entities in order to limit risk exposure. 
 
*Subprime Mortgage- these are low quality loans that were sold by loan originators during the period preceding 
the mortgage market fiasco of 2007-2008. Such loans were issued to home buyers who did not have the 
repayment ability with most of them subsequently defaulting soon after.  
 
*Credit Rating Agencies- these are firms that give an outside perspective or unconditional view of the risk 
exposure and rating of securities that investors are about to invest.  
 
*Conduit Lending- the loan originators generated poor quality loans from high credit risk mortgage borrowers 
without property ‘screening’ them since the originators knew that they would quickly sell off such loans in the 
secondary mortgage markets to unsuspecting secondary mortgage market investors.  
 
2.  Review of Literature 
2.1 Securitized Transactions and Institutions involved in Securitization 
Securitization is the selling of debt instruments backed by a pool of mortgages; the process is associated with 
several frictions which involve moral hazards, adverse selection and principal-agent problems (Ashcraft & 
Schuermann, 2008). Securitization is a financial transaction (under structured finance) in which a corporate 
entity moves assets/ pools assets or loans to an ostensibly bankruptcy–remote/ low risk vehicle to obtain lower 
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interest rates from potential lenders since the standardized securities are collateralized/secured. The process 
involves packaging of designated pools of loans or receivables with an appropriate credit enhancement and 
redistribution of these packages to investors. Transformation of these pools into standardized securities enables 
issuers to deal in a volume large enough that they can bypass intermediaries (Giddy, 2004; Bodie et al., 1992). 
Structured finance is a financing technique tailored to special needs or constraints of issuers or investors (Giddy, 
2008). 
The issues created out of securitization are low risk ventures since the asset cannot be seized in a bankruptcy 
proceeding courtesy of SPVs. An SPV is a legal entity created by a sponsor or originator to carry out some 
specific purpose or a series of transactions (Gorton & Soules, 2005). The SPVs exist essentially to reduce 
bankruptcy costs since they cannot in practice go bankrupt. The risk is therefore low for lenders and they are 
willing to ask for a lower interest rate. This financial process (securitization) leads to an emission of ABS and 
CDOs. Structured finance is a process that involves the creation of complex debt instruments by securitization 
or the addition of derivatives to existing instruments by pooling assets, tranching of liabilities and creation of 
special purpose vehicles to limit risk. Structured finance involves pooling of economic assets and subsequent 
issue of prioritized capital structure claims against these collateral pools (Coval et al, 2008). The securitization 
process involves packaging of designated pools of loans or receivables with an appropriate credit enhancement 
and redistribution of these packages to investors. Transformation of these pools into standardized securities 
enables issuers to deal in a volume large enough that they can bypass intermediaries (Giddy, 2004). Credit 
enhancement is meant to reduce the risk to the investors and subsequently increasing the rating of the securities. 
The process of securitization is complex and involves several parties. Assets (like Mortgage receivables, student 
loans and car loan receivables) are pooled together and shares (backed by these pools of assets) are sold. In this 
process, a suitably large portfolio of assets is ‘pooled’ and sold to an SPV; there is normally no recourse to the 
originator.  The issuer (SPV) is bankruptcy remote since the likelihood of default is minimal; their activities are 
restricted to issuance of securities. A servicer collects payments and monitors the assets; the servicer can often 
be the originator.  They ensure that the loan repayments are paid to the SPV. The investor benefits by investing 
in a specific pool of high quality credit-enhanced assets; all investors receive a pro rata interest in the incoming 
revenues from the asset pool (Lumpkin, 2002). Securitization deals may at times be faced with foreclosure. This 
is the legal right of a lender of money if the borrower fails to repay the money or part of it on the due date. The 
lender would apply to the court to be permitted to sell the property that has been held as a security for the debt; 
in case of mortgage loans, the mortgage lender would sell the house where the mortgagor lives (Bodie et al., 
1992).  
The process of securitization involves many investors with receivables of high quality; the seller usually 
continues to service the receivable. In the management of an ABS, a trustee ensures the orderly payment of 
interest & final payment of interest.  The issuer is often a trust or SPV whose only business activity is to acquire 
and hold the assets, and issue securities backed by the assets. Costs associated with establishing a trust or SPV 
include underwriting fees, servicing fees and other costs. Originator initially owns the assets engaged in the deal. 
The transfer of assets from sponsor (originator) to SPV should constitute a ‘true sale’ to avoid bankruptcy 
challenges. Securitization separates the assets from the originator. The largest sectors of the ABS market in the 
US are securities backed by Credit Card receivables, Auto Loans, Home Equity Loans, Manufactures Housing 
Loans, Student Loans, Small Business Administration Loans, and Bond Obligations (Sharpe et al., 2004).  
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) play a key role in enhancing the cash flow payments to the investors when a 
securitization contract is created. They simply ensure that the investor gets the most out of the deal. They would 
modify the loan terms or even recommend foreclosure as part of administration of the deal. In most cases, 
investors would control the appointment of the special server. They simply maximize the position of the 
investors. To minimize agency conflicts, the special servicer usually holds a portion of the first-loss piece in 
order to align the incentives of the investors and the special server. The first-loss investors are the ones who 
stand to lose a lot if the mortgage borrowers default (Ambrose et al., 2006). 
Rating Agencies are active players in securitized transactions. These agencies provide an outside perspective 
(which is also unconditional) on the risks involved in the securitized issue. They publicly disclosed their rating 
criteria for the subprime mortgages though the investors lacked the ability to evaluate the efficacy of the models 
used. Most of the products offered to subprime borrowers were very complex and subject to misunderstanding 
and/or misrepresentation (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). The Rating Agencies assist in structuring the 
transaction by offering credit enhancement. Rating agencies are important since they provide an outside 
perspective of the risk exposure of the prospective investors. Such agencies mandate changes in the loan 
servicing procedures. The nature and amount of credit enhancement depends on the risk of the securitization as 
determined by the Rating agencies. These agencies give an outside perspective on the liabilities being created 
and allow the investors make a more informed decision. The rating agencies grade the issues into different 
tranches: the Seniour tranche  (which is paid off first incase anything happens) is followed by the mezzanine 
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tranche then the junior tranche which is most likely to be impacted by default- this is usually held by the 
originator (Zywicki & Adamson, 2009).       
Citing Standard & Poor (2008), Mandel, Morgan and Wei (2012) define Credit enhancement as a protection, in 
the form of financial support, to cover losses on securitized assets in adverse conditions. If estimated losses are 
high, then more enhancements are called for to achieve a given rating, all else constant. Credit enhancement is 
meant to reduce the risk to the investors and thereby increasing the rating of the securities. A company that does 
not want to issue bonds directly (this requires a lot of disclosure) can engage an insurance company to put its 
credit behind the corporation for a fee. The firm can then float a bond of “enhanced” credit rating directly to the 
public. Credit Rating Agencies rate the securities in order to provide an external perspective of liabilities being 
created and help the investor make a more informed decision. The fact that a securitization has an AAA rating 
does not mean it is risk free –it only means that the chance of a bondholder incurring a loss attributable to default 
on the underlying assets is remote (Riley & Brown, 2006). 
Bodie et al. (1992) indicates that credit enhancement could take several forms which include: over-
collateralization (whereby the amount of over–collateralization, which is usually 5% to 10%, is often determined 
by the rating agencies and underwriters depending on the receivables),  seniour/ subordinate structure 
(Subordinate or secondary classes of securities are lower rated and bear higher interest rates and if a problem 
arises, higher rated (seniour) securities receive payments prior to the lower rated subordinate securities), liquidity 
provider (this requires a guarantee by the originator that is the entity that either generates receivables or 
assembles portfolios of receivables or another entity of all or a portion of payments due on the securities) and 
cash collateral account (whereby the originator deposit funds in an account with trustee to be used if proceeds 
from receivables are not sufficient). 
2.2  Regulatory Failures leading to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
Regulatory intervention may often be justified on the premise of financial markets being inefficient. Market 
systems are not always informationally efficient since information asymmetries are a common feature of most 
markets and information is a public good whose supply is often insufficient (Stigliz, 1993; Lofgren et al., 2002). 
Liberalization of financial markets is intended to facilitate efficient allocation of resources. The existence of 
market failure does not necessarily justify government intervention since such failures are not directly attributed 
to market problems; instead, they are often seen to be associated with regulatory failure (Stigliz, 1993).  
Dowd (2009) indicates that US policy failures contributed much to the subprime mortgage crisis. Dowd notes 
that misguided intervention by the federal government in the US housing market was largely to blame for the 
crisis. With an ambitious desire to increase home ownership (especially to the low income households who to a 
great extent did not have a repayment ability), the US government introduced some key interventions including: 
the mortgage interest deductions in the tax code, affordable lending requirements (contributing to laxity in 
screening of mortgage borrowers) and the enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 which put a 
lot of pressure to bankers to advance mortgages to individuals with poor credit. Consequently, the US interest 
rates declined from about 6% to 1% in the pre-crisis and crisis period). 
The abuse of securitization in the US mortgage market led to huge investor losses and bankruptcies. The 
mortgage lenders were accused of lending without proper credit risk appraisal leading to subprime loans 
(Purnanandam, 2009). During this period, most of the beneficiaries were advanced huge amounts of loans than 
their repayment ability could justify. The loan originators were equally to blame for lending with an intention of 
selling the loans off their balance sheet in the short run. They therefore lacked the incentive to obtain the 
necessary information from the prospective borrowers before lending. When the originators found that they 
could sell off the loan receivables, their lending practices became rather mechanical hence the proliferation of 
subprime loans. The SPVs (which bought most of these loans), became the victims of asymmetric information 
since they could not tell that the loan originators had actually generated mortgage loans with an intention of 
selling them off their balance sheets in the short run (An et al., 2010).  
To achieve the objective of promoting home ownership to most of the American citizens, the federal government 
established massive government mortgage enterprises sponsored by the government (especially Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac). Fannie Mae was set up in 1938 to expand the ability of residential mortgage finance. Its primary 
role was to buy mortgages from the loan originators and hold them- the institution was later privatized in 1968. 
Freddie Mac was set up in 1970 with the objective of expanding the availability of residential mortgage finance 
primarily through securitization of S & L mortgages. With huge government support, lower capital requirements 
and several legal privileges, the two institutions were able to gain significant control of the US mortgage market 
and consequently contributing much to the growth of mortgage securitization (Dowd, 2009). In year 2002, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development imposed “affordable housing quotas” which encouraged Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to further increase their huge holdings of subprime portfolios (Mitchell, 2008). The 
Greenspan Doctrine of 2002 was also to blame since it held that the Fed could do nothing to stop asset bubbles 
from occurring but would stand by to cushion the fall if they did occur (Dowd, 2009). Bubbles are price 
increases which are far beyond the asset’s true fundamentals. 
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2.3 Theoretical Review 
This section presents an overview of theories that inform the securitization process in mortgage markets. In view 
of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2008, the Securitizer-First and Lender-First theories apply. Bubb and 
Kaufman (2009) extensively explore the role of credit score cut off rules in screening borrowers. They 
subsequently develop Securitizer-First theory to incorporate the concept in the screening process. In a 
securitization deal, the lenders may lack the incentive to properly screen borrowers and obtain relevant 
information if they intend to sell off the loans in an active secondary mortgage market. The use of borrower 
credit scores facilitates measuring their default risk with higher credit scores indicating a lower chance of 
default.  
The Securitzer-First theory was first put forth by Keys, Mukherjee, Suru and Vig (2008). The theory posits that 
secondary-market mortgage purchasers employ rules of thumb whereby they are exogenously most likely to 
purchase loans advanced to borrowers with credit scores just above some cut off. By extension, lenders will 
similarly adopt a screening cut off rule in response. In view of this theory, securitizers exogenously use credit 
score cutoff rules in their purchase decisions and such rules compel mortgage lenders to utilize screening cutoff 
rules to enhance the value of loans sold off (Boston Fed, 2009). This is due to the Securitizers’ demand for loans 
with credit scores above some certain thresholds despite their use of rules of thumb in the market. Since the 
mortgage originators know that they are unlikely to keep the loans above these credit score thresholds (due to 
their sale in the securitization markets), they will adopt weaker screening standards for such loans. Conversely, 
they will apply more stringent rules in screening borrowers whose scores are below the threshold point since 
such loans would remain unsold and into their portfolio (Bubb & Kaufman, 2009; Boston Fed, 2009). A moral 
hazard arises since lenders have knowledge of their malpractices in obtaining borrower information and their 
loan screening incentives unlike the securitizers.      
An alternative theory is the Lender-First theory. In view of this theory, private mortgage securitizers adjust their 
loan purchases around the lender screening threshold in order to maintain lender incentives to screen (Boston 
Fed, 2009). When lenders are encountered with a fixed per-applicant cost of obtaining additional information 
about each prospective borrower, the cutoff rules in screenings will increase endogenously. Since lenders will 
get a higher pay off in collecting more relevant information for high credit risk borrowers, they will be more 
inclined to collect more additional information for those borrowers whose cutoff scores are below the thresholds. 
Heuson, Passmore and Sparks (2000) indicate that credit scoring improves the quality of information and that 
their empirical investigation found a negative correlation between mortgage rates and volume of securitization 
implying causation in that greater securitization reduces mortgage rates. The Lender-First theory thus predicts 
that the volume of loans advanced and their rate of default will be significantly lower for borrowers with cutoff 
scores below the threshold since much of the lenders information search efforts are directed to this category 
(Bubb & Kaufman, 2009). The theory is therefore a more likely explanation for the cut off rules. 
The use of FICO scores is a popular measure of credit risk in order to inform lenders on which loans need 
increased credit screening. Straka (2000) indicates that the use of FICO scores became more popular (in practice) 
in the mid-1990s. A FICO score is a summary measure of an individual borrower’s creditworthiness based on 
their credit history with higher credit scores indicating higher creditworthiness. In most cases, a FICO score of 
620 is considered as the threshold. Interestingly,  a research conducted by Fannie Mae (to ascertain the 
relationship between FICO scores and mortgage performance) showed that despite the borrowers with FICO 
scores of less than 620 representing only a small percentage of the total, they actually contributed to about 50% 
of the total defaults. In 1997, Fannie Mae provided further guidance to lenders by proposing 3 tiers of FICO 
scores: borrowers with FICO scores of above 720 had a ‘very low’ default risk, those with FICO scores between 
660 and 719 had a ‘low’ default risk, those with FICO scores between 620 and 659 “represent a high degree of 
default risk” while borrowers with a credit score of 620 represent a “very high” risk of default (Fannie Mae, 
1995). 
3. Empirical Literature 
3.1 Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities and Special Servicers   
Ambrose, Sanders and Yavas (2006) empirical study was intended to investigate the impact of conflict of interest 
on servicing non-performing loans. Their sample was made up of 46,082 loans in 363 CMBS deals obtained 
from the Intex CMBS database- most of the loans were originated between 1997 and 1999. In total, 27,275 loans 
had different master and special servers, 25,673 had a master server who also performed and carried out other 
special servicing roles for other loans, 1,602 loans had a master server that did not also perform special servicing 
functions for other loans while 17,044 loans had a special server that only performed special servicing functions 
for loans in the database (Ambrose et al., 2006). First, the authors note that the servicing of loans in a CMBS 
transaction could further involve a sub-servicer (who is assigned special functions) besides the main servicer. 
The Special Servicer would take the administration of the loan by either recommending the modification of its 
terms of a foreclosure. They hypothesize that the default risk is highly correlated to whether or not the master 
servicer and special servicer of the pool are the same firm. Ambrose et al (2006) indicate further that there are 
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moral hazards and adverse selection problems when the two roles of master and special server are held by the 
same firm- their findings prove their hypothesis to be true.  
In a CMBS deal, the master server is meant to oversee the overall administration and monitoring of the 
underlying loan and the dispatch of cash flows to the investors in the tranche. However, in the event of a loan in 
the deal failing to perform to expectation, the master server forwards the same to the special server who has the 
rights to restructure the repayment terms, force it to foreclosure or ensure maximum cash flows to the deal 
investors. The moral hazard factor becomes an issue where the master and special server will treat the loan 
differently depending on whether or not they are the same. Adverse selection arises where the willingness of the 
special server to bid for a risky pool may be determined by whether the master server has a high chance of also 
being the special server in the deal.  Ambrose et al. (2006) contend that if the two servers were the same, then 
the special server will have more information about underperforming loans and subsequently put in place more 
effective recovery measures. There are conflicts of interests between the two servicers when handling troubled 
loans- there are inefficiencies created when the two functions are held by the same firm leading to faster 
handling of defaulted loans. Consequently, this enables the master servicer to become more aggressive in 
bidding for a risky pool of loans if the same firm expects to be the special servicer. The master server in a CMBS 
deal supervises the regular cash flows from the loan and manages information and any interaction with the 
performing borrower. 
The Ambrose et al. (2006) study was based on more than 46,000 securitized Commercial real estate loans and it 
eventually supports their hypothesis. They predict a positive correlation by utilizing 46,082 securitized 
commercial real estate loans in 363 CMBS deals to test their conjecture. The study found that the time a loan 
remains in default is much shorter when servicing rights are held by one firm comparative to when they are held 
by two firms. The empirical study analyzes the correlation between default probability of a pool of loans and 
whether the two servicing rights are held by the same firm. They operate with the premise that servicing firms 
prioritize maximize their profits in their activities.  
3.2 Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Pricing of CMBS  
An et al. (2010) document the ‘lemons problem’ in the real estate market. Their empirical investigation narrows 
down to the CMBS and the role played by conduit lenders in the abuse of the securitization process in the US 
mortgage subprime crisis of 2007-2008. Akerlof (1970) documents quality uncertainty problems in the 
automobile markets due to asymmetric information problems that is the ‘lemons problem’. Akerlof uses the 
market for used cars as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty; owners of good cars will not sell their 
cars in the used car market for fear of not getting value for their good cars. This concept is often thought of as 
“the bad driving out the good” in a market. 
The An et al. (2010) empirical work sought to investigate originate-to distribute and originate-to-hold loans, the 
design of securitization in terms of excess leverage, opaqueness of securitized transactions and lax ratings. The 
empirical investigation was based on 142 CMBS deals and 16,760 CMBS loans in the 1994-2000 sample period. 
In particular, the sample included 13,655 conduit loans and 3,105 portfolio loans sold into securitization markets 
during the period 1994-2000. They found that CMBS investors paid a higher price for CMBS backed by such 
conduit loans comparative to portfolio CMBS deals. The study further found that the loan originators lacked the 
incentive to properly screen loans; most of the loans that were created were expressly for pass-through to 
securitization markets. There was no motivation to generate relevant private information on the quality of the 
loans. Theoretically, the An et al. (2010) study confirms that only low quality portfolio loans will be sold in the 
secondary market and their sales price incorporates a “lemons discount”. Conduits gain from loan origination 
fees and do not mind so much about long-term returns that come with portfolio holding of loans. The empirical 
investigation found that in the period 1994-2000, CMBS investors paid higher prices for CMBS backed by 
conduit loans as compared to portfolio CMBS deals. By 1992, conduit lending constituted less than 5% of all 
CMBS. By 1998, conduit lending had grown to 75% and reached almost 100% by 2001. Downing et al. (2009) 
study similarly found that residential mortgage-backed securities sold by Freddie Mac to SPVs were generally of 
poor credit quality compared to those they retained in their portfolio. Freddie Mac simply used private 
information to sell “lemons” to securitization markets.  
The An et al. (2010) empirical work found that portfolio lenders used private information to sell off lower 
quality loans to unsuspecting buyers. The study documents that conduit lenders originated loans with an express 
intention of selling them directly into the securitization markets. Since the buyers of the mortgage loans could 
not perfectly ascertain their quality (they could not also ascertain the credit risk of each loan), the sellers 
(originators) became more aggressive in selling off low quality loans while retaining the high quality loans for 
their own loan portfolio. Eventually, the securitization market was flooded with low quality loans which were to 
become uncollectible.  
The sellers of these bad loans are expressly referred to as conduit lenders since they did not have an incentive to 
collect appropriate borrower private borrower information for loan appraisal since they knew that they were to 
sell off the loans soon after creating them (Stein, 2002). Their profits were mainly from the loan origination fees 
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rather than the long-term returns associated with holding onto a portfolio of the loans. The An et al (2010) study 
confirms that their findings were consistent with those of Downing, Jaffe and Wallace (2009) who showed that 
residential mortgage backed securities sold by Freddie Mac to the SPVs were generally of low credit quality than 
those that Freddie Mac retained in its loan portfolio. Using an information-economics model, the study shows 
why conduit CMBS deals were priced higher than those CMBS deals kept for portfolio purposes and why 
conduit lending became the most popular source of loans in the CMBS secondary market. An et al. (2010) 
compare conduit lending to the Akerlof (1970) ‘lemons problem’ whereby the mortgage originators can separate 
poor quality loans from high quality loans and subsequently assign higher valuations for higher quality loans. 
Eventually, the market for lemons prescribes that lower quality loans will drive higher quality loans out of the 
market place. 
4. Summary 
The paper reviews literature on securitization process, the participation of several parties/institutions in the 
process and financial analysis of empirical work on creation of CMBS and ABS. The paper further provides an 
overview of the credit enhancement process and the role of SPVs, Special and Master servers in a securitized 
transaction. Regulatory failure, intentional malpractices on the part of loan originators and liberalization of the 
US financial market are cited as some of the key issues leading to the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2008. 
The paper documents reforms in the US housing market that precipitated the crisis such as the creation of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac institutions. Securitizer-First and Lender-First theories form the theoretical anchorage of 
the paper. SPVs, Originators, Rating agencies and Trustees are identified as the key parties in the securitization 
process. The paper further captures the various moral hazards and asymmetric information conditions leading to 
creation of subprime loans. Relevant empirical literature on securitization and the crisis is reviewed in a nut 
shell.  
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